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Reflections on Khawar: 
Recognizing the Refugee from Family Violence 
Stephen M Knight 
The progressive development of refugee law, to recognize family 
violence and other forms of gender violence as a 'basis for asylum took a 
major step forward in April 2002 with the decision by the High Court of 
Australia in the Khawar case. I F or more than fifteen years, advocates, 
scholars, and activists have been Working to keep refugee law in pace with 
the recognition of gender violence in international law as a human rights 
concern.2 With the Khawar decision, Australia's highest court has joined a 
growing body of jurisprudence among state parties to the international 
Refugee Convention3 establishing asylum as a recognized protection for 
women fleeing gender abuses such as domestic violence, honor killing, and 
prostitution. 
The central building blocks of this progress have been statements by 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), non-
binding guidelines issued by governments, and decisions by individual 
asylum adjudicators and administrative appeals boards. Standing on this 
foundation, more and more courts are issuing precedent-setting decisions 
that can be then relied on at all levels in deciding future asylum cases. The 
issuance of new supportive guidelines for gender-related claims by the 
• J.D. 1996, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.A. 1987, Yale 
University. Coordinating Attorney at the Center for Gender & Refugee Studies (CGRS). 
I. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Khawar (2002) 187 A.L.R. 574, 
2002 WL 532474 (HCA), available at http;llwww.austlii.edu.aulaulcaseslcthlhigh_ctl2002 
114.htrnl ([2002] HCA 14). 
2. See, e.g., Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, G.A. Res. 
481104, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. Al48/49 (1993); REPORT OF THE 
FOURTH WORLD CONFERENCE ON WOMEN, at 157, U.N. Doc. AlCONF.177/20, U.N. Sales 
No. E.96JV.13 (1995); Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and 
Eradication of Violence against Women, June 9, 1994, 27 U.S.T. 3301, reprinted in 33 
I.L.M. 1534. 
3. United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 
U.S.T.6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Refugee Convention]; see also United Nations 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6224, T.I.A.S. No. 
6577. 
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UNHCR in May 2002 has buttressed this progress.4 Moreover, since 
refugee law is based on an international treaty, decisions of other countries 
are persuasive authority in interpreting the core asylum definition in the 
United States. 
With Khawar, Australia now stands with the United Kingdom, Canada, 
New Zealand, and other countries in recognizing gender violence as a 
proper basis for a grant of asylum. However, as more countries follow suit, 
resistance to this line of authority in the U.S. continues to gather steam, 
seeking to undermine the progress made in the 1990s. Often, it is the 
complex issue of the link, or "nexus," to one of the five Convention 
grounds for granting asylum that is seized upon to deny gender asylum 
cases. The Khawar decision provides a strong example of a way out of this 
dilemma, one that should be welcomed by adjudicators in the U.S. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Pursuant to the Refugee Convention, and under U.S. and Australian 
law, a refugee is defined as a person who 
owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted. for reasons of [1] 
race, [2] religion, [3] nationality, membership of a particular [4] 
social group or [5] political opinion, .is outside the country of his 
nationality and is unable ,or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a 
nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual 
residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to 
it. 5 
4, Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-Related Persecution Within the 
Context of Article lA(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees, UNHCR, at 2, para. I, U.N. Doc. HCRJGlP/02/02 (2002); Guidelines on 
International Protection: "Membership of a Particular Social Group" Within the Context of 
Article lA(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, UNHCR, at 3, paras. 11-12, U.N. Doc. HCRJGlP/02/02 (2002). 
5. Refugee Convention, supra note 3, art. I § A, para. 2, 189 U.N.T.S. at 184 
(illustrating the five Convention grounds for asylum). 
Australian law provides for the granting of a "protection visa" to individuals "to 
whom ... Australia has protection obligations under the Refugee Convention as amended 
by the Refugees Protocol." Khawar (2002), 187 A.L.R. 574, at para. I. 
Under U.S. law, the language varies only slightly. The Immigration and Nationality 
Act defines a refugee as, 
Any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the 
case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such 
person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, 
and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, 
that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on 
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion. 
immigration and Nationality Act § IOI(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § I 101 (a)(42)(A) (1998). 
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While refugee claims from women fleeing gender-related persecution can 
be . linked to any ground of asylum, they are most often made under the 
political opinion, religion, or particular social group grounds. 
In recent decades, violence against women and girls - which often 
occurs in the private rather than public sphere, is carried out by family or 
community members rather than by the government or its agents, and is 
justified by reference to culture or religion - has come to be viewed as an 
important human rights concern.6 Parallel progress has been made 
regarding the rights of women under international refugee law. In 1985, 
the UNHCR Executive Committee encouraged parties to the Refugee 
Convention to consider asylum claims from women based on membership 
in gender-based social groupS.7 Throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
the UNHCR Executive Committee adopted a series of conclusions aimed at 
affording more meaningful protection to women fleeing persecution in their 
home countries.8 Canada, the United States, and other countries responded 
in the 1990s with relevant policy guidelines.9 
6. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 48/104, supra note 2, at 217; see also Vienna Declaration and 
Programme of Action, World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993, para. 18, 
U.N. Doe. AlCONF.l57/23 (1993); REPORT OF THE FOURTH WORLD CONFERENCE ON 
WOMEN, supra note 2; Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and 
Eradication of Viole nee against Women, supra note 2. 
The Beijing Platform for Action, contained in the Report of the Fourth World 
Conference on Women, defines violence against women as "any act of gender-based 
violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physicid, sexual, or psychological harm or 
suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of 
liberty, whether occurring in public or private life." REPORT OF THE FOURTH WORLD 
CONFERENCE ON WOMEN, supra note 2, at para. 113 (1995). The Declaration on the 
Elimination of Violence against Women specifically provides that States have a 
responsibility whether the acts are carried out by the state or private persons, and declares 
that neither "custom, tradition, or religious consideration" can be invoked to justify acts of 
violence against women. G.A. Res. 48/104, supra note 2, at 217. 
7. Executive Committee Conclusions: Refugee Women and International Protection, 
UNHCR Executive Committee, 36th Sess., No. 39, para. (k) (1985), available at 
http://www.unhcr.chlcgi-binltexis/vtxlexcom. 
8. For example, the UNHCR Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women encourage 
states to consider women who face severe violence for violating social mores governing the 
role of women as a "social group." Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women, 
UNHCR, para. 54, U.N. Doc. ES/SCP/67 (1991)., The gender-related Executive Committee 
Conclusions are collected on the CGRS web site. Center for Gender and Refugee Studies, 
UNHCR & UN Documents on Gender & Asylum, at http://www.uchastings.edulcgrsllaw 
lunhcr.html (last visited May 20, 2003). 
9. See, e.g., Consideration for Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims for Women, 
Office of International Affairs, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (May 26, 
1995); Refugee and Humanitarian Visa Applicants: Guidelines on Gender Issues for 
Decision Makers, Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (July 1996), at 
http://www.uchastings,edulcgrsllaw/guidelineslaust.pdf (Australia); Guideline 4: Women 
Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution, Immigration and Refugee Board 
Ottawa, Canada (Nov. 13, 1996), http://www.irb.gc.calenlaboutlguidelines/womenlindex 
_e.htm; Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution, Immigration and 
Refugee Board of Canada (Mar. 9, 1993), http://www.austlii.edu.aulaulother/alrc 
Ipublicationslreports/69/vol1l ALRC69 App2.html# ALRC69 App2; Gender Guidelines for 
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Courts of numerous state parties to the Refugee Convention have 
granted refugee protection to women fleeing gender-related harm, 
including family violence. 10 Domestic violence as a ground for refugee 
protection is well established in Canadian case law. I I In 1999, the House 
of Lords - the United Kingdom's highest court - ruled that Pakistani 
women survivors of domestic violence were eligible for refugee statuS. 12 
Refugees in Australia have been requesting, and in some cases 
receiving, asylum based on fear of domestic violence since the mid-
1990s.13 Some twenty-five percent of the small number of asylum cases 
brought in the middle part of the' 1990s were granted. 14 In a 1994 case 
involving domestic violence, the Australian Refugee Review Tribunal 
noted that, in addition to sharing the immutable characteristic of gender, 
women have "shared common social characteristics" that make them 
cognizable as a social group: 
That domestic violence... is regarded in many countries as a 
private problem rather than a public crime, can be directly 
attributed to women's social status; to the fact that historically, in 
many societies, women have been, and in many instances still are, 
regarded as being the private property of firstly their fathers then 
their husbanq.s. That women face differential treatment within the 
legal system, arising from their social status, is evident from the 
focus given to women and violence, against women, in for example, 
Asylum Atljudication, National Consortium on Refugee Affairs (Nov. 1999), available at 
http://www.web.cal-ccr/safr.PDF (South Africa); Asylum Gender Guidelines, Immigration 
Appeal Authority (Nov. 2000), http://www.iaa.gov.uk/GenInfo/IAA-Gender.htm (U.K.). 
The list of countries with gender guidelines now also includes the Netherlands, Norway, and 
Sweden. See Center for Gender & Refugee Studies, Gender Asylum Law from the Center 
for Gender & Refugee Studies, at http://www.uchastings.edulcgrs/law/law.html(last visited 
May 21, 2003). 
10. See, e.g., Regina v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Shah, 2 AC. 629 (H.L. 
1999) (U.K.) (Pakistani women subjected to domestic violence); Refugee Appeal No. 
71427/99 [2000] N.Z.A.R. 545 (New Zealand Refugee Status Appeals Authority) (Iranian 
woman subjected to domestic violence), available at http://www.uchastings.edulcgrs/law 
Iint1l71427-99.html. 
11. See, e.g., Lim v. Minister of Citizenship & Immigration, [2000] F.C. IMM-4333-99, 
available at http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.calfctl2000/imm-4333-99.html; Minister of 
Employment & Immigration v. Mayers, [1992] C.A. A544-92 (Fed. Ct.), available at 
http://reports.fja.gc.calfc/1993/pub/vIl1993fca0448.html; Case No. AA-01226 (Mar. 19, 
2001) (Convention Refugee Determination Division) (Russian lesbian abused by her ex-
husband). 
12. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Khawar (2002) 187 AL.R. 574, 
at paras. 11-14, 2002 WL 532474 (HCA), available at http://www.austlii.edu.aulaulcases 
IcthJhigh_ctl20021l4.html ([2002] HCA 14) (citing ex parte Shah, 2 A.C. at 635); see also 
Deborah E. Anker et al., Defining "Particular Social Group" in Terms of Gender: The Shah 
Decision and U.S. Law, 76 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1005 (1999). 
13. Scott McKenzie, Beaten Wives Given Asylum, Political Refugees to Suffer, 
ADVERTISER (Adelaide), Dec. 16, 1996, at 2. 
14. See MARY CROCK, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW IN AUSTRALIA 149 (1998). 
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the U.S. Department of State Country Reports. . .. That women 
share a common social status is further evidenced by the 
establishment of the United Nations Commission on the Status of 
Women and other formal mechanisms for the advancement of 
women's status including the U.N. Decade for Women from 1975 
to 1985. 15 
31 
But several cases decided by the Refugee Review Tribunal have denied 
asylum to petitioners who s'ought relief on the basis of family vioience,I6 
and few such cases had made their way to federal court. It appears that no 
such case had been upheld prior to Khawar. 17 
The United States has played a mixed role in this international 
progress .. Advocates for women's rights and refugees successfully lobbied 
for gender guidelines for judges making refugee status determinations and, 
as noted above, in 1995 the United States became, after Canada, the second 
country to publish such guidelines. In 1996, the Kasinga decision 
recognized fear of female genital mutilation as a basis for asylum in the 
United States. IS Building on those two developments, many women fleeing 
gender-based harms have been granted asylum. 19 But there remains a 
dearth of precedent since the two important decisions since 1999 one 
positive and one negative have been erased from the books?O Progress 
has been further stymied by ongoing opposition to the granting of asylum 
in such cases from within the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(INS) and among many asylum adjudicators.21 
Adjudicators in the United States often have particular difficulty 
finding a legal "nexus" between the persecution and one of the five 
15. Refugee Review Tribunal Reference: N93/00656 (Aug. 3, 1994) (Australian Refugee 
Review Tribunal), http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/caseslcthlrrtJN9300656.htrnl (woinan from 
Philippines granted asylum based on domestic violence). 
16. Refugee Review Tribunal Reference: V95/03639 (May 2, 1996), http://www.austlii 
.edu.au/au/caseslcthlrrtN9503639.htrnl; Refugee Review Tribunal Reference: N94/06178 
(Oct. 9, 1995), http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cthlrrtJN9406178.htrnL 
17. See Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Ndege (1999) 59 A.L.D. 
758 ([1999] FCA 783), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cthlfederal_ctlI999 
1783.html; Basa v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) F.C.A. 830, 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/caseslcthlfederal_ ctl1998/830.htrnl ([1998] 830 FCA). 
18. In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (B.IA 1996). 
19. See, e.g., In re R-A-, Interim Dec. 3403 (B.IA 1999); Stephen M. Knight, Seeking 
Asylum from Gender Persecution: Progress amid Uncertainty, 79 INTERPRETER RELEASES 
689,689-90 (2002). 
20. Aguirre-Cervantes v. INS, 242 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2001), vacated, 273 F.3d 1220 
(9th Cir. 2001); In re R· A·, Interim Dec. 3403 (B.LA. 1999), vacated (AG 2001). For more 
on the legal and political struggles leading to the overturning of these cases, see Knight, 
supra note 19, at 690-91; Karen Musalo & Stephen Knight, Steps Forward and Steps Back: 
Uneven Progress in the Law of Social Group and Gender-based Claims in the United 
States, 13 INT'LJ. OF REFUGEE L. 51, 52-58 (2001). 
21. See Knight, supra note 19, at 695-96. 
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requisite Convention grounds for asylum?2 This article will take a close 
look at the Khawar decision and at the developing international consensus 
towards a way out of this confused and unnecessarily complex legal 
quandary. 
II. FACTS 
Ms. Naima Khawar is a Pakistani woman who fled her native country 
after years of escalating physical abuse at the hands of her husband. She 
and her husband were married in 1980 against the wishes of his family, 
who had arranged for him to marry a relative?3 Without his parents' 
approval, her parents also disapproved. After a period of separation, Ms. 
Khawar's husband began to see his family again in the mid-1980s. His 
family remained highly critical of her, and her husband began to take their 
point of view. He was unhappy when they had a second daughter, instead 
of a male child. The abuse from the husband and his family escalated to 
physical violence. At the same time, Ms. Khawar's own family became 
less able to protect her. She knew that if she left hl;:r husband, he would 
take the children away. This threat frightened her into staying with him, 
despite the ongoing persecution. 
Ms. Khawar went to the police on several occasions over a number of 
years. Her first complaint was dismissed with the comment that domestic 
violence was widespread and that "if [the police] had to do something 
about all the similar complaints it would take all their time.,,24 When she 
returned to the police more than a year later to report that her husband had 
threatened to bum her alive, she brought her sister's husband in hope that a 
man's presence would lead the police to act. 25 But the police failed to 
accurately record her complaint. Her fourth and final trip to the police, 
after she had been doused with petrol, ended with a dismissive comment by 
a police officer that women always seek to blame their husbands for their 
own problems.26 She returned home to find that her husband had left; he 
stayed away for two to three weeks, during which time Ms. Khawar 
22. For an introduction and full discussion of the nexus issue, see KAREN MUSALO ET AL., 
REFUGEE LAW AND POLlCY 275-324 (1998). See generally Shayna S. Cook, Repairing the 
Legacy of INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 23 MICH. 1. INT'L L. 223 (2002); Michelle Foster, 
Causation in Context: Interpreting the Nexus Clause in the Refugee Convention, 23 MICH. 1. 
INT'L L. 265 (2002); James C. Hathaway, International Refugee Law: The Michigan 
Guidelines on Nexus to a Convention Ground, 23 MICH. 1. INT'L L. 207 (2002). 
23. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Khawar (2000) 101 F.C.R. 501, 
para. 95, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/federal_ctJ2000/1130.htmI 
([2000] FCA 1130). 
24. Jd. at para. 97. 
25. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Khawar(2002) 187 A.L.R. 574, 
para. 94, 2002 WL 532474 (HCA), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cthihigh 
_ctJ2002/14.htrnl ([2002] HCA 14). 
26. Jd. 
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decided to flee Pakistan.27 
III. THE DECISIONS BELOW 
A. THE REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL 
With her three children, Ms. Khawar entered Australia in June 1997 
and applied for asylum in September of that year. Her case was rejected in 
February 1998 by an administrative officer, and she appealed to the 
Refugee Review Tribunal (hereinafter Tribunal).28 Ms. Khawar proposed 
that she was a member of a number of particular social groups, including, 
among others, "women," "married women in Pakistan without the 
protection of a male relative," and "women who have transgressed the 
mores of Pakistani society.,,29 
Ms. Khawar submitted substantial material in her attempt to show that 
there is "a systematic failure by police authorities in Pakistan" with respect 
to efforts by victims of domestic violence to gain protection,30 including 
substantial documentation "concerning the negative attitude of the 
Pakistani authorities to complaints by women in [her] position.,,3l 
In January 1999, the Tribunal issued its decision denying her claim for 
asylum.32 Although the Tribunal noted that there was an anonymous 
allegation in the record that Ms. Khawar had fabricated her story in 
collaboration with her husband, the court accepted as credible her 
allegations of abuse,33 and held that the treatment Ms. Khawar was 
subjected to did amount to persecution.34 However, the Tribunal ruled that 
she failed to make out a case for asylum because the court did not see any 
link between the persecution and a ground for asylum. 
It is clear to the Tribu~al that the problems which the applicant 
faced with her husband were problems peculiar to their 
relationship. There is nothing in the evidence before the Tribunal 
to suggest that the applicant was being targeted by her husband or 
his family for a Convention reason. She was being harmed and 
harassed because of the particular dynamics of the family into 
27. Khawar (2000), 101 F.C.R. 501, at para. 102 . 
. 28. !d. at para. 86. 
29. Khawar (2002), 187 A.L.R. 574, at para. 52. 
30. !d. at para. 53. 
31. Jd. at paras. 95, 97. As summarized by Justice Kirby, these materials included reports 
from Amnesty International and the U.S. Department of State, a human rights brief by the 
Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board, and a cable from the Australian Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade. Jd. 
32. !d. at para. 7. 
33. !d. at para. 51. 
34. !d. at para. 99. 
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which she married and the circumstances of her marriage.35 
The Tribunal did not make a ruling regarding any of the social groups 
to which Ms. Khawar alleged she belonged, nor did it suggest an 
alternative group. Instead, it rested its denial on the basis that there was no 
nexus to a Convention ground and that Ms. Khawar had been harmed for 
solely personal reasons because her husband's family members "were 
angry or shamed by the fact that he married her fi)f love when he was 
already engaged to a relative and because she brought no dowry to the 
family. She was also seen as being responsible for her husband being 
estranged from his family for five years.,,36 "The Convention," declared 
the Tribunal, "was not intended to provide protection to people involved in 
personal disputes.,,3? 
Regarding Ms. Khawar's submissions pertaining to the police and the 
failure of governmental protection in Pakistan, the Tribunal made no 
factual findings. 38 
B. THE FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS 
I. The First Appeal 
Ms. Khawar appealed the denial of her asylum claim to the Federal 
Court. She asserted that the Tribunal's failure to make factual findings on 
her efforts to gain police protection from her husband amounted to an error 
oflaw.39 
A Federal Court judge reversed the denial of asylum to Ms. Khawar.4o 
Relying in part on a UK. decision by the House of Lords in the Shah 
case,41 the judge found that the Tribunal had erred in failing to make 
findings of fact regarding Ms. Khawar's efforts to gain protection from the 
State. In addition, the Federal Court ruled that the Tribunal's failure to 
determine whether Ms. Khawar was a member of any particular social 
group was a legal error: "[T]he tribunal reached a conclusion on the 
question of whether [the applicant's] fear of persecution was for reason of 
her membership of a particular social group without first identifying the 
35. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Khawar (2000) 101 F.C.R. 501, 
para. 103, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/federal_ctl2000/1130.html 
([2000] FCA 1130). 
36. ld. at para. 104. 
37. ld. at para. 105. 
38. ld. at para. 107. 
39. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Khawar (2002) 187 A.L.R. 574, 
para. 54, 2002 WL 532474 (HCA), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cthlhigh 
_ctl2002114.html ([2002] HCA 14). 
40. Khawar v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affilirs (1999) 168 A.L.R. 190 
([1999] FCA 1529). 
41. Regina v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Shah, 2 A.c. 629 (H.L. 1999) 
(U.K.). For more on this decision see Anker et aI., supra note 12. 
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relevant social group, if any, of which [the applicant] was a member.,,42 
The judge cited to ex parte Shah, noting that the U.K. House of Lords had 
found married women in Pakistan to be a social group.43 
2. The Second Appeal 
The government appealed this ruling to the full Federal Court, which, 
on August 23, 2000, affirmed the judge's decision overturning the 
Tribunal, by a split vote of two to one.44 
Writing for the majority (one judge concurred without opinion), Judge 
Lindgren relied in part on ex parte Shah, as well as on the decision of the 
Australian High Court in Chen, which ruled that persecution under the 
Refugee Convention does not require "enmity" by the persecutor.45 Chen 
stands for the concept that "persecution" can take the form of a 
discriminatory withholding by the state from the members of a particular 
social group of goods or services that the state provides to other persons. ,>46 
The decision described two alternative legal theories under which Ms. 
Khawar's claim to asylum can be viewed. Under one view, the conduct of 
the Pakistani authorities in withholding police protection against violence 
from members of a particular social group alone stands as persecution "on 
account of' membership in that groUp.47 By the other view, it is the 
conduct of the husband and the state together that links the persecution to 
the social group of which she is a member.48 
In support of this latter view, the court quoted Lord Hoffman's 
powerful example, from ex parte Shah, of the Jewish shopkeeper; it is 
worth quoting at length. 
Suppose oneself in Germany in 1935 .... [S]uppose that the Nazi 
government in those early days did not actively organise violence 
against Jews, but pursued a policy of not giving any protection to 
Jews subjected to violence by neighbours. A Jewish shopkeeper is 
attacked by a gang organised by an Aryan competitor who smash 
his shop, beat him up and threaten to do it again if he remains in 
business. The competitor and his gang are motivated by business 
rivalry and a desire to settle old personal scores, but they would not 
have done what they did unless they knew that the authorities 
42. Khawar (2002), 187 A.L.R. 574, at para. 55. 
43. Id. 
44. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Khawar (2000) 101 F.C.R. 501, 
available at http://www.austlii.edu.auJauJcases!cthlfederal_ctJ20001l130.html([2000] FCA 
1130). 
45. Chen Shi Hai v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 170 
A.L.R. 553, 2000 WL 1241956 ([2000J HCA 19); Khawar (2000), 101 F.C.R. 501, at paras. 
113-22. 
46. Khawar (2000).101 F.C.R. 501. at para. 121. 
47. Id. at paras. 124-29. 
48. Id. at paras. 130-36. 
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would allow them to act with impunity. And the ground upon 
which they enjoyed impunity was that the victim was a Jew. Is he 
being persecuted on grounds of race? Again, in my opinion, he is. 
An essential element in the persecution, the failure of the 
authorities to provide protection, is based upon race. It is true that 
one answer to the question "Why was he attacked?" would be 
"because a competitor wanted to drive him out of business." But 
another answer, and in my view the right answer in the context of 
the Convention, would be "he was attacked by a competitor who 
knew that he would receive no protection because he was a Jew.,,49 
This analysis is clearly applicable to the situation of much violence against 
women, which occurs in an atmosphere of impunity because of official 
discrimination, repression, and neglect. Judge Lindgren also noted the 
following equation applied by Lord Hoffman (in Shah): "Persecution = 
Serio.us Harm + The Failure of State Protection.,,50 Under this equation, the 
required nexus can be found based on a failure or' absence of state 
protection that itself is linked to a Convention ground. 
Concluding its analysis, the Australian federal judge ruled that the 
requisite nexus to a Convention ground was to be found in the social 
context in which the domestic violence took place. 
I would hold that a state perception of a particular social group as 
"inferior," "less deserving" or "second class" by reference to the 
rest of society, and, in particular, a view of members of the group 
as not possessing the same human rights as the rest of society or, if 
possessing them, as not entitled to have them enforced and 
protected to the same extent as the rest of society, would constitute 
a motivation that would be entirely consonant with the 
Convention's definition and preamble. In the present case, there 
was evidence before the [Refugee Review Tribunal] on which it 
might have found that "women in Pakistan" or "married women in 
Pakistan" are so regarded and also that such a view of Ms. Khawar 
formed part of the attitude of her husband and his family and the 
police, that caused them to act towards her as they did. 51 
The government again appealed against this decision, this time to 
Australia's highest court. 
49. Id. at para. 133 (quoting Regina v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Shah, 2 
AC. 629, paras. 653-54 (H.L. 1999) (UK) (emphasis added)). 
50. Id. at para. 132 (quoting ex parte Shah, 2 AC. 629, at para. 653; citing REFUGEE 
WOMEN'S LEGAL GROUP, GENDER GUIDELINES FOR THE DETERMINATION OF ASYLUM CLAIMS 
IN THE UK 5 (1998)). 
51. Id. at para. 141. 
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IV. KHAWAR: THE HIGH COURT'S OPINION 
On April II, 2002, the Australian High Court rejected the 
government's appeal and affirmed the Federal Court's reversal of the 
Tribunal's decision.52 The High Court sat in a panel of five justices; four 
justices voted in the majority, writing three separate decisions. There was 
one dissent. 53 
That the protection of the Refugee Convention extends to individuals 
persecuted by non-State actors was not contested. 54 On its appeal to the 
High Court, the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs framed 
the case as raising two issues: 
[W]hether the failure of the country of nationality of an applicant 
for a protection visa to provide effective police protection against 
domestic violence to members of a particular social group is 
capable itself of constituting persecution for reasons of a 
[Convention] ground ... [, and] whether fear of harm directed at 
the applicant by a non-State agent for non-Convention reasons, 
together with or in the knowledge of the failure of the state of 
nationality to provide effective police protection against such 'harm 
to members of a particular social group to which the applicant 
belongs, "is capable of giving rise to protection obligations" to the 
applicant. 55 
For his part, Chief Justice Gleeson presented the question before the High 
Court as follows: 
The first issue is whether the failure of a country of nationality to 
provide protection against domestic violence to women, in 
circumstances· where the motivation of the perpetrators of the 
violence is private, can result in persecution of the kind referred to 
in Art. IA(2) of the Convention. 
The second issue is whether women (or, for present purposes, 
women in Pakistan) may constitute a particular social group within 
the meaning of the Convention.56 
Thus the High Court was squarely presented with the purely legal question 
of whether domestic violence could be a basis for Refugee Convention 
protection in Australia.57 
52. See Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Khawar (2002) 187 A.L.R. 
574, paras. 36-37, 88-90, 2002 WL 532474 (HCA), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au 
/aulcases/cthlhigh_ctl2002/14.html ([2002] HCA 14). 
53. Id at paras. 133, 157. 
54. /d. at para. 114. 
55. Id. at paras. 58-59. 
56. /d. at paras. 5-6. 
57. Much space is devoted, in two of the three affinning opinions, to a discussion of the 
original understanding of "state protection" under the Convention, the result of the 
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A. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The opinion of Justice Michael Donald Kirby dealt at greatest length 
with the most relevant issues. At the outset, Justice Kirby directly 
addressed a core question regarding the nature of the objection to the 
Tribunal's decision: Was the Tribunal's error factual or legal? This can be 
a critical question because of the differing standard of review for legal 
versus factual questions on appeal. Justice Kirby extensively detailed 
certain factual material presented by Ms. Khawar, including her repeated 
complaints to the police and her evidentiary submissions regarding the 
rights and status of women in Pakistan. 58 Justice Kirby ruled that the 
Tribunal committed a legal error when it failed to consider this evidence, 
apparently deeming it irrelevant once it had ruled that Ms. Khawar was not 
persecuted "for reasons of' her membership in any social group.59 
Taken in isolation such a finding might seem to be one of fact -
assigning the harm that was accepted to have been proved to a 
cause based on a particular family's domestic disputes. If that 
were all, the decision would have to be affirmed by the courts, 
confined as they are in this respect to correcting errors of law on 
the part of administrative decision-makers. But when the 
significant factual material tendered by the respondent is taken into 
account, the material before the Tribunal arguably takes on a 
different character. It is then possible, indeed essential, to consider 
the family dispute concerning the respondent in the light of the 
material about the serious legal, social and practical disadvantages 
suffered by the respondent and women in her position which she 
presented to the Tribunal. The Tribunal might still conclude that 
the respondent did not fall within the Convention definition. But it 
government's urging the High Court to find that "persecution and protection are distinct 
concepts" under refugee law. This historical discussion is of limited relevance here, and I 
will not go into it in detail. To briefly summarize, a question arose around the significance 
of part of the phrasing of the definition of refugee by the Refugee Convention, as a person 
who, "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the 
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself 
of the protection of that country." Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. 
Khawar (2002) 187 A.L.R. 574, para. 60, 2002 WL 532474 (HCA), available at http://www 
.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cthlhigh_ctl20021l4.html ([2002] HCA 14) (emphasis added). 
Suffice it to say that, while it appears that the "original intent" of the emphasized language 
may have referred literally to external proteetion - in the sense of the refugee seeking out 
the embassy or consulate of her country of origin - "there now e)(jsts jurisprudence that has 
attributed considerable importance in refugee status determination to the availability of state 
protection inside the country of origin .... " Id. at para. 72 (quoting UNHCR, Interpreting 
Article I of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, paras. 35-36 (April 
2001» (emphasis added). 
58. Id. at paras. 94-98. 
59. Id. at paras. 99-100. 
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could scarcely do so lawfully without considering, and making 
essential findings of fact about, the case that the respondent had 
propounded to bring herself within the Convention definition. In 
short ... it was not open to the Tribunal to ignore the respondent's 
claim that her case was a paradigm instance of the discrimination 
of Pakistani law and official practice against women in her 
position, which amounted to persecution, justifying her fear about 
returning to Pakistan.6o 
Thus the High Court reviewed the Tribunal's decision as an error of law. 
B. PERSECUTION AND STATE PROTECTION 
39 
Justices Michael McHugh and William Gummow, writing jointly, 
accepted the following propositions put forward by Ms. Khawar: 
[T]hat (a) she was unable to obtain police protection in respect of 
the domestic violence she suffered; (b) that state of affairs 
represented a denial of fundamental rights otherwise enjoyed by 
nationals in Pakistan; and (c) it was a foon of selective or 
discriminatory treatment which amounted to persecution by the 
State authorities.6t 
The justices ruled that "the persecution in question lies in the 
discriminatory inactivity of State authorities in not responding to the 
violence of non-State actors.,,62 The justices explained that the legal 
difficulty for the High Court in making a final decision in the case arose 
because the Tribunal itself made "no findings of fact upon Mrs. Khawar's 
allegation that she could not obtain police protection in respect of the 
domestic violence she suffered.,,63 
For his part, Justice Kirby ruled that it is "sufficient that there is both a 
risk of serious harm to the applicant from human sources and a failure on 
the part of the state to afford protection that is adequate to uphold the basic 
human rights and dignity of the person concerned.,,64 Relying on a well-
known if unreported decision from the New Zealand Refugee Status 
Appeals Authority,65 Justice Kirby presented the following classification of 
cases based on the level of State involvement: 
60. Id. at para. 100. 
61. Id. at para. 79. 
62. [d. at para. 87. 
63. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Khawar (2002) 187 A.L.R. 574, 
para. 80, 2002 WL 532474 (HCA), available at http://www.austlii.edu.aulaulcases/cthlhigh 
_ctl2002/14.html ([2002] HCA 14). 
64. Id. at para. 115. 
65. Refugee Appeal No. 71427/99 [2000] N.Z.A.R. 545, para. 60 (New Zealand Refugee 
Status Appeals Authority), available at http://www.uchastings.edulcgrsllaw/intI171427-99 
.html. 
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a. Persecution committed by the state concerned. 
b. Persecution condoned by the state concerned. 
c. Persecution tolerated by the state concerned. 
d. Persecution not condoned or not tolerated by thl! state concerned 
nevertheless present because the state either refus~:s or is unable to 
offer adequate protection.66 
Justice Kirby quoted the New Zealand court's reasoning at length for the 
proposition that the nexus requirement is satisfied where there is a showing 
of a link between a Convention ground and either th<! harm amounting to 
persecution, . or to the failure of protection by the state. He restated the 
equation referenced by the court below: "Persecution = Serious Harm + 
The Failure of State Protection.,,67 The Tribunal's decision must be 
reversed, explained Justice Kirby, because that body's failure to make 
factual findings with respect to State protection constituted "a failure to 
address one of two grounds where the respondent was entitled to succeed if 
she made either of them good.,,68 "This is because 'persecution' is a 
construct of [these] two separate but essential elements .... Logically, if 
either of the two constitutive elements is 'for reason of a Convention 
ground, the summative construct is itself for reason of a Convention 
ground.,,69 
To illustrate the impact of the Tribunal's error in failing to consider the 
evidence pertaining to the status of women in Pakistan, Justice Kirby 
pointed out that the dousing of Ms. Khawar with gasoline by her husband 
took place in a context of prior threats of violence and was substantiated by 
corroborating country conditions .. "It is impossible to believe that a similar 
act directed to the husband or another male victim would have been treated 
by police in Pakistan in such a dismissive fashion.,,7o 
In his brief comments, .the chief justice agreed that persecution can be 
found based on the "combined effect" of multiple agents.?l 
C. SOCIAL GROUP ANALYSIS 
The definition of the relevant social group - and specifically its exact 
breadth - was an issue that concerned all the Khawar justices, Justices 
McHugh and Gummow ruled that the evidence supported a social group 
comprising, "at its narrowest, married women living in a household which 
did not include a male blood relation to whom the woman might look for 
66. Khawar (2002), 187 A.L.R. 574, at para. 114. 
67. ld. at para. 118; see also supra note 50 and accompanying t(:xt. 
68. Khawar (2002), 187 A.L.R. 574,at para. 122. 
69. ld at para. 120 (footnote omitted) (quoting the New Zealand Refugee Status Appeals 
Authority in Refugee Appeal No. 71427/99 (2002] N.Z.A.R. 545, para. 112). 
70. ld at para. 115. 
71. Jd. at para. 27. 
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protection against violence by the members'ofthe household.,,72 But they 
added that the specific nature of the social group was a legal matter for the 
Tribunal on remand.73 
Justice Kirby noted the government argument that categories 
encompassing large numbers of people, such as "women in Pakistan," 
could never satisfy the legal requirements under the Convention.74 He 
suggested that a legal focus on the failure of state protection, rather than on 
the "domestic conflict," would allow an adjudicator to define a particular 
social group "in a principled manner, specifically by reference to the 
ground upon which the state concerned has withdrawn the protection of the 
law and its agencies.,,75 
The materials presented by the respondent to the Tribunal suggest 
that there may be a particularly vulnerable group of married 
women in Pakistan, in dispute with their husbands and their 
husbands' families, unable to call on male support and sUbjected 
to, or threatened by, stove burnings at home as a means of getting 
rid of them yet incapable of securing effective protection from the 
police or agencies of the law. In the present case, because of the 
approach which it took, the Tribunal did not embark upon a 
consideration of whether there was a specific, and thus identifiable, 
"social group" of such a "particular" character and, if so, whether 
the respondent was a member ofit.76 
The chief justice observed, again in brief, that "In my view, it would be 
open to the Tribunal, on the material before it, to conclude that women in 
Pakistan are a particular social groUp.,,77 
D. NEXUS 
Chief Justice Anthony Gleeson ruled that the nexus requirement is 
72. !d. at para. 81. 
73. !d. 
74. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Khawar (2002) 187 AL.R. 574, 
pani. 128,2002 WL 532474 (HCA), available at http://www.austlii.edu.aulaulcases/cthlhigh 
_ctl20021l4.html ([2002] HCA 14); cf Regina v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte 
Shah, 2 AC. 629 (H.L. 1999) (U.K.) (approving "women in Pakistan" as social group). 
75. Khawar (2002), 187 AL.R. 574, at para. 126. 
76. Id. at para. 129. In the United States, cases have been decided on narrowly tailored 
social groups. See In re Kasinga, 21 L & N. Dec. 357 (B.LA 1996) (noting that recognized 
social groups often encompass within their definition many of the elements of an asylum 
seeker's burden of proof, which must be proven in order to be granted asylum); Guidelines 
on International Protection: "Membership of a Particular Social Group" Within the 
Context of Article IA(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees, supra note 4, at para. 19 ("A claimant must still demonstrate a well-
founded fear of being persecuted based on her membership in the particular social group, 
not be within one of the exclusion grounds, and meet other relevant criteria."); Knight, 
supra note 19, at 691-92. 
77. Khawar (2002),187 AL.R. 574, at para. 32. 
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satisfied where at least one agent of persecution is motivated by a 
Convention reason. 
Where persecution consists of two elements, the criminal conduct 
of private citizens, and the toleration or condonation of such 
conduct by the state or agents of the state, resulting in the 
withholding of protection which the victims are entitled to expect, 
then the requirement that the persecution be by reason of one of the 
Convention grounds may be satisfied by the motivation of either 
the criminals or the state.78 
This is a crucial line of reasoning that, as with Lord Hoffman's powerful 
example of the Jewish shopkeeper in Shah, recognizes the nature of the 
persecution and the context in which it takes place. 
E. A DISSENT 
Justice Ian Callinan dissented. He would have ruled that the Tribunal 
was correct in holding that there was no nexus between the violence 
suffered by Ms. Khawar at her husband's hand and any ground for asylum 
in the Refugee Convention. 
I cannot regard it as erroneous for the Tribunal ... to approach the 
case upon the basis that, however the sociai group might be 
defined, another cause was identified, and in my opinion correctly 
identified, as the reason for the abuse. What the Tribunal did was 
to identify the actual cause of the violence. Once it had done so, it 
was apparent that it was a different cause, or, that it occurred for a 
different reason, from any Convention reason. And that cause, 
coupled with reluctance, rather than deliberate abstention, by the 
police, still could not amount to a Convention reason.79 
Justice Callinan also questioned whether Ms. Khawar had been persecuted, 
quoting from the opinion of the dissenting judge below: 
It would, in my mind, be an incorrect use of the word 'persecution' 
to apply it to a failure or lack of interest by the police to come to 
the aid of a person who has been beaten at least where the law 
provides, if enforced, adequate protection and there is no 
government policy that police ignore calls for help .... 
Persecution involves the doing of a deliberate act, rather than 
inaction.8o 
In his opinion, the chief justice responded to this point by noting that the 
question of governmental protection cannot easily be put aside by simply 
78. Jd. at para. 31. 
79. ld. at para. 156. 
80. ld. at para. 149. 
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characterizing the government's position as one of inaction: "Whether 
failure to act amounts to conduct often depends upon whether there is a 
duty to act . . . .,,81 
Justice Callinan conceded that Ms. Khawar's "vvlnerability as a 
woman in an abusive relationship may have contributed to the reluctance of 
the police to assist her."S2 But Justice Callinan questioned the definition of 
the particular social group with reference to gender. "To regard half of the 
humankind of a country, classified by their sex, as a particular social group 
strikes me as a somewhat unlikely proposition. A group must be part of 
something less than a whole. . .. [T]here needs to be a clear linkage or 
common thread between the people said to constitute the particular social 
group.,,83 
F. CONCLUDING HIGH COURT GUIDANCE 
Two of the High Court opinions set out some guiding parameters for 
judges to consider in hearing asylum claims based on family violence. 
They were responding perhaps to concerns raised in the dissent, as well as 
seeking to provide some guidance for lower courts adjudicating these cases 
in the future. In a central paragraph, Chief Justice Gleeson made explicit 
his response to certain concerns surrounding the making of a legal 
judgment that a domestic violence surv~vor should not be returned to a 
particular country. He cautioned that, . 
[1]t would not be sufficient for Ms Khawar to show 
maladministration, incompetence, or ineptitude, by the local police. 
That would not convert personally motivated domestic violence 
into persecution on one of the grounds set out in Art. IA(2). But if 
she could show state tolerance or condonation of domestic 
violence, and systematic discriminatory implementation of the law, 
then it would not be an answer to her case to say that such a state 
of affairs resulted from entrenched cultural attitudes. An 
Australian court or tribunal would need to be well-informed about 
the relevant facts and circumstances, including cultural conditions, 
before reaching a conclusion that what occurs in another country 
amounts to persecution by reason of the attitude of the authorities 
to the behaviour of private individuals; but if, after due care, such a 
conclusion is reached, then there is no reason for hesitating to give 
effect to it. 84 
A similar note was struck by Justice Kirby: 
81. /d. at para. 28. 
82. /d. at para. 152. 
83. Khawar (2002). 187 A.L.R. 574, at para. 153. 
84. /d. at para. 26. 
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Many countries (including, at least until quite recently, Australia) 
have afforded imperfect protection to women who suffer domestic 
violence. It does not follow that it is impossible to distinguish 
those countries that, however imperfectly, provide agencies of the 
law and non-discriminatory legal rules to address the problem from 
those countries that, for supposed religious, cultural, political or 
other reasons, consciously withdraw the protection of the law from 
a particularly vulnerable group within their society.85 . 
With these instructions, the Australian High Court reversed the Tribunal's 
denial of asylum to Ms. Khawar and remanded the case for further 
proceedings.86 
V. NEXUS: A WAY OUT 
With its decision in Khawar, the High Court of Australia has added its 
powerful voice to a growing wave of precedent f:lVoring asylum from 
domestic violence and further solidified the foundation for progress in 
recognizing other forms of gender-based violence, such as trafficking for 
prostitution, sexual slavery, and honor killing. Because it is interpreting 
the same refugee definition, Khawar is persuasive authority in the United 
States on the subject of the breadth of that definition, and U.S. courts 
should consider its reasoning. 
The Khawar decision was issued at almost the same time as UNHCR's 
new guidelines on gender-related persecution,87 and it is consistent with the 
UNHCR's affirmation "that the refugee definition as a whole should be 
interpreted with an awareness of possible gender dimensions in order to 
determine accurately claims to refugee status.,,88 On the subject of nexus, 
the gender guidelines are simple arid straightforward: 
In cases where there is a risk of being persecuted at the hands of a 
non-State actor (e.g. husband, partner or other non-State actor) for 
reasons which are related to one of the Convention grounds, the 
85. Id. at para. 130. 
86. Id. at paras. 37, 90, 132. 
87. Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-Related Persecution Within the 
context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees, supra note 4; Guidelines on International Protection: "Membership of a 
particular social group" Within the context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or 
its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 4. These guidelines are a 
product of the UNHCR's process of "Global Consultations" marking the fiftieth anniversary 
of the Refugee Convention in 200 I. The guidelines reflect in part the work of Rodger 
Haines, whose paper on gender-related persecution was presented at the Expert Roundtable 
on Gender Persecution in San Remo,. Italy, Sept. 6-8, 200 I, and who is among the experts 
who contributed to the Michigan Guidelines. See Hathaway, supra note 22. 
88. Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-Related Persecution Within the 
context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees, supra note 4, at para. 2. 
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causal link is established; whether or not the absence of State 
protection is Convention related. Alternatively, where the risk of 
being persecuted at the hands of a non-State actor is unrelated to a 
Convention ground, but the inability or unwillingness of the State 
to . offer protection is for reasons of a Convention ground, the 
causal link is also established.89 
45 
UNHCR thus adopts the formula that Persecution = Serious Harm + The 
Failure of State Protection, and subscribes to the notion that the nexus 
requirement is satisfied by proof of a causal link between either. This 
formulation has also been embraced by leading international scholars in the 
field,90 who emphasize that the focus of the nexus inquiry is properly on the 
reasons for the asylum seekers' fear, "and not on the personal motivations 
of potential persecutors. ,,91 . 
The UNHCR has stated that, 
[A] particular social group is a group of persons who share a 
common characteristic other than their risk of being persecuted, or 
who are perceived as a group by society. The characteristic will 
often be one which is innate, unchangeable, or which is otherwise 
fundamental to identity, conscience or the exercise of one's human 
rights.92 ' 
Additionally, the Australian chief justice's suggestion that "women in 
Pakistan" be recognized as a particular social group is in conformity with 
UNHCR's observation that some jurisdictions have recognized "women" 
as a social group,93 and points out that the size of a group" is not a relevant 
criterion in determining whether a particular social group exists.,,94 
The Khawar case .presents an interesting comparison to the leading 
domestic violence asylum case in the United States, In re R_A_.95 Unlike 
that negative decision, which has been extensively written about 
89. Id. at para. 21, 
90, As stated in the Michigan Guidelines: 
The causal link between the applicant's predicament and a Convention 
ground will be revealed by evidence of the reasons which led either to the 
infliction or threat of a relevant harm, or which cause the applicant's country 
of origin to withhold effective protection in the face of a privately inflicted 
risk Attribution of the Convention ground to the applicant by the state or 
non-governmental agent of persecution is sufficient to establish the required 
causal connection, 
Hathaway, supra note 22, at 215, para. 8. 
91. Foster, supra note 22, at 338. 
92, Guidelines on International Protection: "Membership of a particular social group" 
within the context of Article lA(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating 
to the Status of Refugees, supra note 4, at para, 11, 
93, Id. at para, 18. 
94, Id. at para. 19. 
95. In re R- A-, Interim Dec. 3403 (B.l.A. 1999), vacated(AG 2001). 
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elsewhere,96 Khawar arose in a setting where there was limited factual 
development of the claim, and even unresolved allegations in the record 
that the applicant's entire story was fabricated. 97 Yet, rather than struggle 
to reshape the law to avoid granting her asylum, as the majority attempted 
in Matter of R-A-, the Khawar court made a straightforward positive legal 
ruling on her eligibility under the existing law. 
As Justice Kirby pointed out, Ms. Khawar's application for asylum 
from domestic violence is consistent with case law in Canada, the United 
Kingdom, and New Zealand.98 With its decision in Khawar, Australia now 
stands with these and other countries in recognizing gender violence as a 
proper basis for a grant of asylum. With the addition of the well-reasoned 
Khawar decision, there now exists a "substantial body of international 
practice,,99 interpreting the Refugee Convention to include protection from 
gender-based violence as a basis for asylum. In this regard, the United 
States increasingly stands alone in its resistance to recognizing the refugee 
from domestic violence. 
96. See, e.g., Karen Musalo, Matter of R-A-: An Analysis of the Decision and its 
Implications, 76 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1177 (1999) (discussing In re R-A-and its 
potential impact); Amanda Blanck, Note, Domestic Violence as a Basis for Asylum Status: A 
Human Rights Based Approach, 22 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 47 (2000) (arguing that the 
current asylum definition is inadequate to protect women against violations of human 
rights); Haley Schaffer, Notes & Comments, Domestic Violence and Asylum in the United 
States: In re R-A-, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 779 (2001) (arguing that the In re R-A- decision was 
wrong because the court adopted an overly restrictive framework). 
97. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Khawar (2002) 187 A.L.R. 574, 
para. 8, 2002 WL 532474 (HCA), available at http://www.austliLedu.aulaulcases/cthihigh 
_ctJ2oo2114.html ([2002] HCA 14). 
98. Id. at para. 124. 
99. Id. at para. 125. 
